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INTRODUCTION 
NY A, through its conditional offer of the Disputed Extension Payment, sought to 
rewrite the terms of the REPC to make a better bargain than it negotiated. The letter 
accompanying the Disputed Extension Payment required the Harri sons to agree to NY A's 
purpose and expectation in entering the REPC, which included novel terms located 
nowhere in the express terms of the REPC that were at odds with the Harrisons' purpose 
and expectations. In spite of the disputed interpretation of the REPC, the Harrisons 
remained willing to sell the Property to NY A, and notified NY A of their willingness in 
writing. 
But NYA no longer wanted to purchase the Property. The real estate market had 
softened, so, through this litigation and the Disputed Extension Payment, NY A sought a 
refund of its money and an exit from its contractual obligation to purchase the Property. 
NY A's behavior was a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and based 
on a faulty rejection of any "reasonable time" to close on the purchase of the Property. 
The Harrisons' rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment was a proper rejection of 
NY A's attempt to modify the express terms of the contract, and the district court erred in 
concluding that rejection was a material breach of the REPC, especially given NY A's 
continued willingness to sell the Property. 
In its opposition, NY A claims that the Harrisons want the Court to rewrite the 
terms of a bad bargain. But NY A fails to address key case law concerning the 
obligations of contracting parties when a contract expressly grants discretion to one side. 
Rather than seeking to add terms to the REPC, the Harrisons merely want this Court to 
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uphold and affirm decades of case law requiring NYA to exercise the broad grant of 
discretion given to it under the REPC consistent with the parties' justified expectations, 
including closing within a reasonable time. Even if the Court somehow disagrees with 
the Harrisons' interpretation of the REPC, the Court should reject NY A's attempt to force 
its own interpretation of the REPC down the Harrisons' throat, an action which in itself 
was a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. NY A's conditional 
payment was not valid tender of NY A's August Extension Payment. And even if the 
conditionally offered Disputed Extension Payment did constitute valid tender, the 
Harrisons' rejection of that tender was not a material breach of the REPC, an argument 
fully briefed and preserved in the Harrisons' motion to reconsider. The Court should 
reject NY A's bully tactics and reverse the district court's holding that the Harrisons' 
rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment constituted a breach of the REPC excusing 
further performance by NY A. 
The Court should similarly reject NY A's nitpicking arguments about attorney fees 
and prejudgment interest. The Court need not decide these issues because NYA is 
entitled to no damages or fees because it breached the REPC by failing to tender 
extension payments and failing to purchase the Property. If the Court reaches the 
attorney fees and prejudgment interest issues, it should affirm the district court's exercise 
of its discretion to determine the reasonableness of NY A's fees. The Court should also 
uphold the district court's ruling that prejudgment interest accrues from the time of the 
alleged breach. 
DMWEST #12487523 v1 2 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
NYA HAD NO CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DELAY CLOSING 
INDEFINITELY 
NYA incorrectly argues that a grant of "sole discretion" in the addendum to the 
REPC is an express contractual right to extend closing for any reason whatsoever for as 
long as it deems necessary, thus limiting the application of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. It also appears to argue, for the first time, that the justified expectation of 
the parties was that NY A was purchasing the Property for development, and that this 
understanding extended unfettered discretion to NY A with respect to the extensions so 
long as it was attempting to develop the Property. Both arguments are in error. 
The Harrisons do not seek a ruling that establishes a new right, is inconsistent with 
express contractual terms, or would require NY A to act to its own detriment to benefit the 
Harrisons. See Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, 1 19, 173 P.3d 865 (explaining 
limitations on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing). Rather, the Harrisons argue 
that NY A was required to exercise its "sole discretion" to extend the settlement deadline 
"consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other 
party." Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,143, 104 P.3d 1226. 
The justified expectations of the parties here were that NYA would purchase the 
Property, and not that the parties would enter into a lop-sided option agreement or seller-
financed transaction. To the extent the parties understood that NYA would purchase the 
Property for development purposes, NY A violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing for failing to take any steps whatsoever to develop the Property between early 
DMWEST #12487523 v1 3 
2008 at the time it stopped making Extension Payments. NYA also violated the covenant 
~ of good faith and fair dealing with its attempt to bully the Harrisons into accepting its 
disputed interpretation of the REPC. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the district 
court's ruling that NYA could extend settlement an unlimited number of times without 
violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
A. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Does Not Modify 
Existing Contractual Rights or Establish New Rights 
"[E]ven express contractual rights must be exercised reasonably and in good 
faith." Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 
284, 127, 243 P .3d 888; see also Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt., LLC 
2006 UT App 331,123, 153 P.3d 714. Utah Courts have consistently held that the 
requirement to act in good faith does not modify express contractual terms, even while 
expressly limiting a party's unfettered exercise of its contractual rights. For instance, in 
Cook Assocs., this Court held that even though SITLA had an express, unambiguous 
contractual right to "adjust the rental rate every five years as SITLA deems necessary in 
the best interest of the State," it was not automatically permitted to increase drastically 
~ the rent obligations in a way that deprived the lessee of the benefit of the Lease. Cook 
Assocs., 2010 UT App 284, 1127-29. Similarly, in Alpha Partners, this Court held that 
even thought the plaintiff had an express contractual right to vary fees "20% above or 
below the estimates stated in" the contract, any variance in fee must be consistent with 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Alpha Partners, 2006 UT App 331, 1122-23 
("Interpreting the contract to permit additional fees based solely on the whim of 
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[plaintiff] would be inequitable and would produce an absurd result."). In neither of 
these cases was the Court making a better bargain for the parties than they made for 
themselves. Rather, the Court required that the party with discretion behave consistent 
with the parties' justified expectations when exercising express contractual rights. 
NY A cites Brown v. Moore in support of its argument that a reasonable time to 
close on the Property is inconsistent with and in addition to the express terms of the 
REPC. In Brown, the defendant met its "only express contractual obligation," and was 
not required to permit plaintiff "to recover their investment" before exercising its 
contractual right to take over plaintiffs business. 973 P .2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not be 
read to add terms not related to an "express obligation" of either party. Id. In contrast, 
here NYA had an express contractual obligation to purchase the Property, and was 
required to comply with its express contractual obligation in good faith. 
NY A was required to exercise its express contractual right to extend the settlement 
deadline in compliance with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. When it failed 
to purchase the Property in a reasonable time, it violated the covenant. Moreover, even if 
NY A was ultimately right that it was entitled to extend the settlement deadline 
indefinitely, or at least until it was "feasible" to develop the property to its "maximum 
potential," the conditional tender was a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing because it prevented the Harrisons from continuing to accept extension payments 
unless they were willing to forego their claims against NYA. Accordingly, the Court 
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should reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to the Harrisons on this 
G0 issue. 
B. NYA Did Not Exercise Its "Sole Discretion" in Good Faith 
The REPC's grant of "sole discretion" to NYA required NYA to exercise that 
discretion consistent with the justified expectations of the parties. Neither party to a 
contract-but especially a party with an explicit grant of discretion-may "do anything to 
injure the other party's rights to receive the benefits of the contract." Eggett v. Wasatch 
Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, ,r 14, 94 P.3d 193; see also Markham, 2007 UT App 379, 
,r 18; Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,r 19, 84 P.3d 1154; Cook 
Assocs. 2010 UT App 284, ,r 27. Exercise of discretion that renders the performance of 
the other party "difficult or impossible" is also a violation of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
NY A argues that the contractual requirement of an additional $6,250 earnest 
money payment to extend the settlement for 30 days constitutes an express limit on 
NY A's discretion to extend the contract thereby negating the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing as to the extension of the settlement deadline. However, the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing does not evaporate merely because there is some contractual 
limit on the exercise of discretion. Eggett, 2004 UT 28, ,r 17. Rather, "the degree to 
which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the covenant turns on the extent 
to which the contracting parties have defined their expectations and imposed limitations 
on contract terms." Id ,r 16. While an express term may have an impact on how the 
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Court interprets a "reasonable" time for performance, it does not eliminate the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. For instance, in Eggett, the defendant argued that it could 
not have breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it valued the 
plain ti fr s business using GAAP, as specified by an express term of the contract between 
the parties. 2004 UT 28, ,r 17. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because 
defendant "had the opportunity to employ some discretion in its use of GAAP," it was 
required to exercise that discretion in a way that would artificially depress the book value 
of the company. Id.; see also Alpha Partners, Inc., 2006 UT App 331, ,r 23. Similarly 
here, NYA argues that any application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
would eviscerate its contractual right to extend the settlement deadline at its "sole 
discretion." But a specific contractual term with implicit discretion, such as the 
application of GAAP in Eggett or the unspecified date for performance here, requires 
more, not less, application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to protect the 
vulnerable party from an inappropriate use of discretion. 
Accordingly, NY A was permitted to extend the settlement deadline, so long as it 
did so consistent with the parties' expectation that the Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
was a purchase agreement and that NY A would, in a reasonable time, purchase the 
Property. 
C. NYA Did Not Act Consistently With the Justified Expectation of the 
Parties 
For the first time in briefing this issue, NYA appears to argue that the justified 
expectation of the parties was that NY A would purchase the Property only when it was 
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feasible to develop it. However, the undisputed facts demonstrate that regardless of 
~ whether the Harrisons were aware of an intent by NYA to develop the Property, the 
Harrisons at all times considered the REPC to be a purchase contract that would be 
performed within a short period of time. (Aplt. Br. at Factual Background 111-16.) 
Additionally, if the purpose of the REPC was to enable NYA to develop the Property, 
NY A violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to take any steps to 
arrange for the development of the Property for an entire year before the Harrisons 
requested it comply with its obligation to purchase the Property, and eighteen months 
before the date Harrisons deemed reasonable for NYA to close. 
None of the provisions of the REPC NY A cites support the argument that the 
Harrisons' justified expectation was that NY A could extend settlement indefinitely to 
accomplish maximum development of the Property. NYA cites to paragraph 1.2 of the 
REPC, paragraphs 2, 7, and 8 of Addendum 1, and paragraph 1 of Addendum 2. 
Paragraph 1.2 of the REPC and paragraph 1 of Addendum 2 both relate to water rights. 
In Paragraph 1.2 of the REPC, NY A requests "[a] 11 water rights attached to property and 
necessary for development." In paragraph I of Addendum 2, the Harrisons agreed to 
transfer 20.27 water shares to the City of Springville "per their requirement for Buyer's 
proposed development." Addendum 1 paragraph 2 permits NY A to conduct broad due 
diligence "to determine that the property is satisfactory for Buyer's intended use." 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 provide that the Harrisons would "sign within a reasonable time 
..dJ period all pertinent applications and documents required for governmental approval of 
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Buyer's proposed development"1 and that they will provide access to the Property to 
Buyer "for any testing, inspections, surveying, and other similar services for developing 
the Property. While these provisions show that the Harri sons were generally aware that 
NY A planned to develop the Property (which they have never disputed), they do not 
demonstrate that the Harrisons intended that NY A could hold the Property under contract 
indefinitely while it waited for it to become "economically feasible" to develop the 
Property to its "maximum potential." 
On the contrary, as set forth in the Harrisons' statement of facts and corresponding 
record cites, NY A owner Steve Kelly assured the Harrisons that he intended to close on 
the Property within a short period of time. (Aplt. Br. at Factual Background ,r,r 10-12.) 
Nothing in the communications between the parties indicates that either side believed the 
transaction was based on the economic feasibility and cost of development. (See Real 
Estate Purchase Contract("REPC"), attached to Aplt. Addendum as Exhibit 4; Addendum 
1 to REPC, attached to Aplt. Addendum as Exhibit 5; Addendum 2 to REPC, attached to 
Aplt. Addendum as Exhibit 6; R. 149-52.) Further, the undisputed facts establish that 
NY A ceased making any effort to develop the Property by early 2008. (Aplt. Br. at 
Factual Background 1,r 13-14.) Nonetheless, it wasn't until a year later that the Harrisons 
requested that NYA close in a reasonable amount oftime. (Id. ,r 15.) 
If it is true that the justified expectations of the parties were that NY A would 
develop the Property, it breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to 
1 The requirement that the Harrisons act expeditiously indicates an intent on NY A's part 
to close within a reasonable time. 
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pursue development. See PDQ Center, Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah Ct. App. 
~ 1997). In PDQ Lube Ctr., this Court held that the plaintiff violated the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing when he failed to comply with his obligations under a purchase 
contract within a reasonable time, intending to "kill the deal" with his delay, which 
deprived defendant of the benefit of the bargain. Similarly here, NY A hoped to either 
"kill the deal" with its indefinite delay or to exact an interest-free loan from the Harrisons 
while it rode out the market downturn. Because there is no dispute that NY A did nothing 
to develop.the Property for at least eighteen months before the Disputed Extension 
'...:P Payment, this Court should rule that it violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
as a matter of law. 
II. THE REPC DID NOT SPECIFY A TIME FOR PERFORMANCE AND 
NYA FAILED TO CLOSE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
A contract without a specified time for performance must be completed "within a 
reasonable time under the circumstances." Richins Drilling, Inc. v. Golf Servs Grp, Inc., 
2008 UT App 262, ,r 5, 189 P.3d 1280. "What constitutes a reasonable time depends 
upon the subject matter, the nature of the act to be performed, and the situation of the 
\,jjj) parties." Salt Lake City v. State, 125 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1942). 
NY A claims that because the REPC permitted "an unlimited number" of 
extensions of the settlement deadline, that the REPC specified a time for performance of 
x + 30, and the Court may not read a reasonableness limitation into the REPC. But an 
unlimited number of extensions, by definition, does not provide a definite time for NY A 
to purchase the Property, as it promised to do in the REPC. Additionally, the undisputed 
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facts show that NYA failed to close within a reasonable time as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that NYA was not 
required to close within a "reasonable time" and hold that NY A breached the REPC by 
failing to close. 
A. The REPC Did Not Specify a Time for Performance 
The REPC here is silent on the time for performance. Although it permits NY A to 
extend the settlement deadline at its "sole discretion" it does not include the essential 
term of how many extensions are permitted under the contract. Under such 
circumstances, the Court can supply a reasonable time for performance. Richins Drilling, 
Inc., 2008 UT App 262, ,r 5. It is important for the Court to supply this essential term: to 
accept NY A's interpretation means that under the REPC, NYA would be permitted to 
pay $6250 per month in interest-free extension payments for forty years until the entire 
purchase price had been paid. 2 The Court should avoid contract construction that leads to 
an "absurd" result. See Okelberry v. W. Daniels Land Assoc., 2005 UT App 327, ,r 24, 
120 P.3d 34 (declining to interpret a contract in a manner that could lead to absurd 
results). 
NY A cites Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills to support its argument that 
the Court should not supply a reasonable time term to the REPC. In Hidden Meadows, 
neither party argued that the option contract at issue needed to be performed within a 
reasonable time. 511 P .2d 73 7 (Utah 1973 ). Rather, the parties disputed the effective 
2 Defendants are an elderly couple. Defendant Jan Harrison passed away during this litigation. 
Considering the advanced age and ailing health of the Defendants, they could not have possibly 
intended for the contract to extend interest-free for forty years. 
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date of cancellation of the option under the terms of the contract. Id. at 471. The Utah 
~ Supreme Court declined to invalidate the agreement for vagueness, holding that the terms 
of renewing the option were "clear, certain, definite, and unambiguous." Id. at 472. 
However, Hidden Meadows pertained to an option contract, not a purchase contract, that 
permitted cancellation by either party under the express terms of the contract. Not only 
was the reasonableness of the time for performance not at issue in the case, it would not 
have been at issue given that either party had equal discretion to terminate the option 
contract under equal terms. Accordingly, this case has no bearing on whether the Court 
vi) should read a reasonable time for performance into the REPC. 
Because there is no definite settlement deadline specified in the contract, NY A 
was required to close in a reasonable time, and breached the contract when it failed to 
purchase the Property. 
B. Based on the Undisputed Facts, NYA Failed to Close in a Reasonable 
Time 
NY A claims that the Court cannot rule that it failed to close within a reasonable 
time as a matter of law. But Utah case law is clear: when the facts are undisputed, a 
\rD reasonable time for performance can be decided as a matter of law. Salt Lake City v. 
State, 125 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1942); see also IHC Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt., 2008 
UT 73 1 19, 196 P .3d 5 88 (holding plaintiff did not waive its rights as a matter of law 
because the pertinent facts were undisputed). When a contract does not contain a definite 
time for performance, the party seeking performance in a reasonable time must give 
sufficient notice to the other party to enable it to perform. See, e.g. Tanner v. 
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Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980) (holding that where there was no definite 
time to perform, "the seller must give notice and a reasonable time to perform before he 
may insist upon holding the buyer strictly to the time requirements."); Adair v. Bracken, 
745 P.2d 849, 853 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
NY A argues that the "limited facts" supporting that it failed to close within a 
reasonable time are subject to dispute. Specifically, it claims that the original closing 
date, communications between the parties during the pendency of the contract, NY A's 
failure to terminate the contract during the due diligence period, and the five-month 
period of time offered by the Harrisons for NY A to procure financing to close on the 
Property are not relevant to a determination of a reasonable time. But NY A does not set 
forth any opposing facts tending to show that August 2009 was an unreasonable amount 
oftime for it to close. Its only attempt to do so is a false claim that the contract was 
"dependent on development of the property," (Aplee. Br. at 30), which is at odds with the 
express terms of the REPC. Because the facts relating to reasonableness are undisputed, 
the Court should rule as a matter of law that NY A failed to close within a reasonable 
time. 
III. NYA DID NOT TENDER THE DISPUTED EXTENSION PAYMENT AND 
THE HARRISONS DID NOT BREACH THE AGREEMENT 
NY A argues that the letter accompanying the Disputed Extension Payment did not 
add any additional terms to the contract and therefore was not conditional tender. "In 
order to be valid, tender of payment on a contract must be (1) timely, (2) made to the 
person entitled to payment, (3) unconditional, ( 4) an offer to pay the amount of money 
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due, and (5) coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent." Brady v. 
~ Park, 2013 UT App 97,145, 302 P.3d 1220. Accepting conditional tender means 
waiving any objection to the terms under which the tender is offered. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-5-802. 
NY A argues that its tender merely demanded performance and agreement to terms 
the Harrisons had already agreed. In support, it points to a disclaimer in the letter 
accompanying the Disputed Extension Payment which states that "Nothing in this letter 
should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other than those 
·-d) provided under the REPC." However, the terms in the letter required the Harrisons to 
agree to terms that were not contained in the REPC and would have modified the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Most notably, the letter required the Harrisons to 
agree that 
The REPC could be extended, at [NY A's] discretion . . . to allow for the 
property to be developed to its full potential. This includes, but is not 
limited to: sewer line extension installed to the property, storm drainage 
readily available, and property being economically feasible to develop 
under zoning ordinances of Springville City and existing market conditions. 
(R. 116-17.) There are no terms in the REPC that permit NY A to extend closing 
indefinitely to permit development of the Property to its "full potential." NYA did not 
object to the sewer line or storm drainage during the due diligence period. It constantly 
assured the Harrisons that closing would take place in the not-too-distant future. Had the 
Harrisons agreed to NY A's terms, it would have given up substantial contract rights, 
including the right to insist on performance within a reasonable time and a right to insist 
that NYA exercise its express contract rights consistent with the parties' justified 
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expectations. Therefore, the tender of the Disputed Extension Payment added terms to 
the parties' previous agreement, was conditional on the acceptance of those terms, and 
was not valid. 
NY A argues that the Harrisons misconstrue the holding in Century 21 All Western 
Real Estate & Inv. v. Webb. In Century 21, the Utah Supreme Court held that a letter 
from the buyer indicating he was ready, willing, and able to close was not sufficient 
tender because "of the buyers' insistence" that the seller comply with a term not 
expressly stated in the purchase contract. 645 P .2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). That is exactly 
what NY A did with its letter accompanying the Disputed Extension Payment. 
Accordingly, the Court should hold that the Disputed Extension Payment was not valid 
tender and that NY A breached the REPC by failing to make the Disputed Extension 
Payment or any Extension Payment thereafter due, and failing to close on the Property 
within thirty days of the previous extension payment. 
IV. ANY BREACH BY THE HARRISONS WAS IMMATERIAL 
The Harrisons' supposed breach of the REPC by rejecting the Disputed Extension 
Payment was not material as a matter of law. This issue was properly preserved in the 
district court, and if it was not, should still be considered because the district court's 
failure to consider materiality was plain error. 
A. Rejecting the Disputed Extension Payment Did Not Breach the REPC 
NYA claims that the Harrisons' rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment 
breached the REPC, but it ignores the fact that the Harrisons at all times remained willing 
to sell the Property to NYA, which was their obligation under the REPC. It is true that 
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the Harrisons have always maintained the position that a failure to make the August 
~ Extension Payment was a breach of the REPC, but the Harrisons never stated that they 
would not sell the Property to NY A. In fact, in the September 2 Response specifically 
states that in spite of NY A's failure to make the August Extension Payment, the 
Harrisons would "continue to accept the monthly checks so long as [NY A withdrew its] 
inappropriate conditions." {Letter from J. Boren to K. Kelly, Sept. 2, 2009, a copy of 
which is attached to Aplt. Addendum as Exhibit 9.) They further indicated that it would 
be willing to negotiate a reasonable time to for closing. Id. 
NY A also takes issue with the Harrisons' cites to the law of anticipatory breach 
rather than actual breach. NY A does not dispute that the Harrisons at all times were 
willing to sell the Property to NY A. Rather, it claims that the Harrisons were 
contractually obligated to accept the Disputed Extension Payment, and actually breached 
the contract when they refused it. But the Harrisons' obligation under the REPC was to 
~ sell the Property to NY A, an obligation they did not disclaim even after NY A breached 
the REPC by failing to make the Disputed Extension Payment. Therefore, the Harrisons 
did not anticipatorily or actually breach the contract. Even if the rejection of the 
Disputed Extension Payment could be construed as a breach of the REPC under these 
circumstances, it was not a material breach excusing NY A's further performance. 
B. Rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment Was Not a Material 
Breach 
NY A cites no authority for its bald assertion that the Harrisons are "wrong" about 
the lack of materiality of their supposed breach. (See Aplee. Br. at 37.) That is because it 
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cannot. Only a material breach excuses the performance of another party. Cross v. 
Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ,r 26, 303 P.3d 1030. As set forth in the Harrisons' opening 
brief, the district court considers certain factors in determining whether a breach is 
material. (Aplt. Br. at 23-24.) NYA does not specifically address those factors. Instead, 
it argues, without any cite to the record, that "[ t ]he settlement date and the right to extend 
it were substantial and material provisions of and crucial components of the REPC." 
(Aplee. Br. at 37.) However, it does not follow that by rejecting the Disputed Extension 
Payment that NY A would be deprived of its right to extend settlement to the extent the 
REPC permits such extension. At the time the Harrisons rejected the Disputed Extension 
Payment, the parties were engaged in litigation to determine the legally correct 
interpretation of the REPC. NY A has presented no evidence, because none exists, that 
the Harrisons would not have abided by a court ruling that NY A was entitled to unlimited 
extensions under the REPC. For this reason and the reasons set forth in the Harrisons 
opening brief, rejection of the Disputed Extension Payment cannot be considered a 
material breach excusing further performance by NY A. 
C. The Harrisons Adequately Preserved Their Materiality Argument 
Rather than fully responding to the Harrisons' argument on the materiality of their 
supposed breach, NY A relies on its claim that the materiality of the breach was not 
preserved. "An issue is preserved if it is raised in a timely fashion, clearly identified, and 
adequately briefed." Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44,123,215 
P.3d 152. This means issues must be (I) "raised in a timely fashion," (2) "specifically 
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce ... relevant legal authority." 438 
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Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ~ 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the Harrisons 
@ stated in their briefing on their motion to reconsider that "[ d]eclining to accept 
conditional tender under [ the circumstances of the Disputed Extension Payment] cannot 
be a material breach of the REPC." (R. 665, 670.) The Harrisons went on to explain that 
"[O]ne party's breach excuses further performance by the non-breaching 
party if tlie breach is material." Or/ob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT 
App 430, ,I 26, 124 P.3d 269 (emphasis added). "[A] breach is material if a 
party fails to perform an obligation that was important to fulfilling the 
purpose of the contract." Tooele Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Tooele City, 2012 
UT App 214, ,r 18, 284 P.3d 709. Conversely, "a breach is not material if 
the party's failure was minor and could be fixed without difficulty." Id. 
While the materiality of a breach is usually a question of fact, if the facts 
are undisputed, it is a question oflaw. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 
1206, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Here, the Harrisons at all times 
manifested their willingness to accept the Extension Payment without the 
inappropriate conditions imposed by NY A. Under these circumstances, the 
Harrisons' objection to the August 31 Extension Payment-even if the 
Court determines those conditions were implicit to the REPC and did not 
modify it-could not have been a material breach of the REPC sufficient to 
excuse NY A's further performance. Indeed, if the Court considers the 
Harrisons' objection to the tender to be a breach (it was not), the breach 
was "minor" and not "important to fulfilling the purpose of the contract." 
Tooele Assocs. Ltd. P 'ship, 2012 UT App 214, ~ 18. All NYA needed to do 
was withdraw its conditions and proceed under the REPC as the parties had 
been doing for nearly two years. Accordingly, the Court erred by 
determining that the Harrisons materially breached the REPC as a matter of 
law, excusing NY A's further performance. 
(R. 664-65.) This argument was timely raised in response to NY A's argument that the 
Harrisons supposed breach excused NY A's further performance under the contract. It 
was specifically raised, and substantial case law and analysis was included in the 
briefing. Accordingly, the district court had an adequate opportunity to consider and rule 
on the issue of the materiality, and the issue was preserved on appeal. 
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Even if the materiality argument was not adequately preserved, the district court's 
failure to consider materiality was plain error. "The plain error test requires 'the 
demonstration of error; a qualitative showing that the error was plain, manifest, or 
obvious to the trial court and evidence that the error affected the substantial rights of a 
party." Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119,132,208 P.3d 
1077 quoting IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,r 36, 196 P.3d 
588. One of the stated elements of the first breach rule is that only material breaches 
excuse the other party's performance under a contract. See Or/ob v. Wasatch Medical 
Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430, ,r 26, 124 P.3d 269 ("It is well-settled law that one party's 
breach excuses further performance by the non-breaching party if the breach is 
material." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, even had the Harrisons not fully briefed the 
issue of materiality, the district court engaged in plain error when it ignored the 
materiality of the Harrisons' supposed breach. The result of this error was that the Court 
erroneously held that the Harrisons' immaterial breach of the REPC excused NY A's 
further performance under the REPC. This substantially affected the Harrisons' rights. 
Therefore reversal under a plain error standard is appropriate. 
V. NYA DID NOT ELECT LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
NYA argues that it can recover liquidated damages even though it did not seek 
them in its Complaint and even though the plain language of the REPC required NY A to 
choose between liquidated damages and legal remedies. Specifically, the REPC permits 
the Buyer to "either accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit as 
liquidated damages" or to "sue Seller" for specific enforcement of the contract or "pursue 
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other remedies available at law." (REPC ,r 16.) The language of the paragraph is 
disjunctive, not conjunctive. Nothing in paragraph 16 permits the Buyer to sue for 
liquidated damages. Rather, once the Buyer sues the Seller, it forecloses the option of 
demanding and receiving liquidated damages. NY A elected to pursue its remedies at law 
and is not entitled to liquidated damages under the plain language of the REPC. NY A 
apparently recognized this choice when drafting its Amended Complaint because it does 
not seek-or even mention-liquidated damages in its allegations or prayer for relief. 
(See R. 32-41.) 
NY A argues that it should be permitted to pursue both liquidated damages and 
remedies at law simultaneously under the doctrine of election of remedies. However, the 
Utah Court of Appeals specifically rejected this argument under the same section of the 
standard form REPC applicable in this case. McKean v. Crump, 2002 UT App 258, ,r 12, 
53 P.3d 494. In McKeon, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a nondefaulting Seller 
elected to retain the earnest money deposit and was therefore not entitled to actual 
damages. Id. ,r 16 (holding that the "plain language" of paragraph 16 of the REPC 
"provides that the [nondefaulting party] must elect" either liquidated damages or lawsuit). 
Although NY A claims that a defaulting Seller should be treated differently under the 
REPC, it provides no principled reason for this distinction. Just as the plain language in 
paragraph 16 of the REPC requires the Seller to make an election to forgo liquidated 
damages before pursuing legal action, it also requires the Buyer to choose between 
..;; making a "demand" for liquidated damages or bringing legal action. (REPC ,r 16.) NYA 
never made such a demand here, and in fact pursued remedies at law several months 
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before August 31, 2009, the date the Court held that the Harrisons breached the contract 
by refusing NY A's conditional tender. By bringing legal action against the Harrisons, 
NY A elected to pursue its remedies at law and is not entitled to liquidated damages. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY A WARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
NY A claims the district court erred in awarding attorney fees because it did not 
allow NY A to recover for legal work that was not supported by a reasonably detailed 
description· of the work performed. The district court has discretion to determine what 
constitutes "reasonable" attorney fees. See, e.g., R. T Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 
120, 40 P.3d 1119 (holding that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review 
for the reasonableness of attorney fees). A district court would abuse its discretion if it 
awarded fees that were not "based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact." 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Here, the district court properly "[made] an 
independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees," ~nd determined that 
it could not evaluate the reasonableness of fees that were not described. Id.; see also R. 
922. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying compensation for these 
requested fees because the description NY A provided is not a reasonably detailed 
description of the work performed and does not justify the reasonableness of the attorney 
fees sought as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah law. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 73. Rule 73 provides that an affidavit of attorneys must include "( 1) the basis for the 
award; (2) a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work performed ... ; 
[ and] (3) factors showing the reasonableness of the fees." Id. A party can only recover 
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"reasonable" attorney fees. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. NYA provided only vague 
@ descriptions for the legal work performed. For instance, the Detail of Work Performed 
provided by Mr. Jeffs' office lists "research" throughout without specifying what topics 
were researched. (See, e.g. R. 404-08.) The billing statements provided by Ray Quinney 
& Nebeker are similarly vague, listing, among other vague descriptions, a telephone call 
about "legal issues" on February 12, 2009, "contract issues" on March 11, 2009, and 
analysis of"contract issues" on April 2, 6, 7, 13, 2009. (R. 443, 447.) Accordingly, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion, when it excluded these fees from the award of 
~ attorney fees. 
NY A also seeks attorney fees should the Court determine that it is entitled to 
pursue its liquidated damages claim and if it prevails on appeal. NY A should not receive 
its attorney fees because it should not prevail on appeal. Additionally, should the 
Harrisons prevail on appeal, they are entitled to their attorney fees on any matters on 
~ which they are the prevailing party. Finally, should the outcome of the appeal change the 
balance of which party is prevailing, the case should be remanded to the district court to 
decide which party is prevailing and evaluate and award reasonable attorney fees. See RT 
Nielson Co., 2002 UT 11, 1125, 28. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CALCULATED PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST 
If the district court correctly ruled that the Harrisons breached the REPC on 
August 31, 2009, the district court correctly awarded prejudgment interest from the date. 
See Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 1122-23, 82 P.3d 1064 (awarding 
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prejudgment interest from date of breach of contract); Staker v. Hunington Cleveland Irr. 
Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Utah 1983). Specifically, because the date of breach is the 
date that "the amount of [NY A's] loss [was] fixed," prejudgment interest accrued from 
that date. Bjork v. April Indus., 560 P .2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). In Staker, the district 
court awarded the plaintiff repayment for overpaid irrigation fees, and awarded 
prejudgment interest from the date the overpayment was established, not the date each 
overpayment was made. Staker, 664 P .2d at 1191. 
NY A claims it is entitled to prejudgment interest as of the date of each Extension 
Payment, not the date of breach. In support, NYA cites Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App 
241, ,r, 27-28, 75 P.3d 925. In Anderson, the Court awarded prejudgment interest on the 
amount of the earnest money, down payment, and taxes, that the purchaser of real 
property had made on a contract that was later rescinded. Id. ,r 27. This makes sense in 
the context of a rescission claim because the goal of rescission is "to return parties to the 
status quo." Id. , 11. When a contract is rescinded, there is no date of breach. Rather, it 
is as if the contract never existed. In contrast, if the Harrisons breached the REPC, the 
amount of NY A's loss was not fixed until the breach occurred. Accordingly, the Court 
should uphold the district court's calculation of prejudgment interest from the date of 
breach rather than from the date of each Extension Payment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to NY A and denial of summary judgment to the Harrisons 
and remand the case to the district court for a determination of damages. 
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